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Abstract 
Although civil society in Bangladesh is recognized for its vibrant performance in social 
development, it is often criticized for its inability to influence good governance and 
democracy. The aim of this paper is to point out the reasons for this failure of civil society. 
Through performing case studies upon five civil society organizations (CSOs) representing 
different sectors and levels of the civil society, the paper concludes that CSOs in Bangladesh 
are often politicized and co-opted by different political parties. In a typical scenario in other 
countries, civil society can provide a counterbalance or even monitor the state both at the 
national and local levels. However, in Bangladesh, often CSOs have compromised their 
autonomy and politicized themselves to certain political parties or political blocks. In such a 
vulnerable position, civil society can hardly play its expected role to ensure good governance 
and strengthen democracy. 
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Introduction  
Bangladesh is often called a ‘development show-case’ where civil society organizations are 
found to be successful and active in micro-credit, empowerment and social development 
initiatives. It is also often cited as a success story for the Neo-Tocquevillean school1 
(Diamond 1999; Fisher 1998; Hulme and Edwards 1997). However, the political system is 
still struggling with a poor economy and, as a fledgling democracy, is marked by 
confrontation and violence. The vibrant civil society is often criticized for its weak 
contributions to democracy (Lewis2004; Quadir 2003; Ahmed 2011). The case of Bangladesh 
forms a stark contrast to the Neo-Tocquevillean assumption that a strong civil society fosters 
democracy, holds the state in check, and contributes to development (Howell and Pearce 
2001, p. 40). Civil society is considered central to both the promotion and maintenance of 
democracy (Diamond 1999, p 239). Naturally, the question arises as to why the vibrant civil 
society in Bangladesh fails to contribute to the institutionalization of democracy there. This 
paper seeks to discover the reasons behind the weakness of Bangladesh’s civil society. It 
begins with the hypothesis that most civil society organization (CSOs), both modern types 
such as development-oriented non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and conventional 
types such as professional groups, trade unions, and citizen’s groups, are politicized and co-
opted by the major political parties. Due to this co-optation, CSOs fail to function 
autonomously in their interactions with the state, whether in acts of cooperation or of 
negotiation. With the help of individual case studies of five CSOs representing different 
sectors of the civil society, this paper argues that civil society in Bangladesh often 
compromises its ability to monitor the state and politics and become politicized. In most 
cases they become compelled to come to such situations just to survive, achieve their primary 
organizational objectives, or earn personal gains for their leaders. 
This paper is based on empirical research. The first section gives a theory-based 
explanation and description of politics, civil society and its politicized nature in Bangladesh, 
using the most accurate theoretical lenses available. The second section comprises five case 
studies of CSOs representing different sectors of the civil society. The case study analyses 
verify the politicized and compromized vigilance of civil society in Bangladesh inferred in 
the theoretical section. 
                                                             
1De Tocqueville (1873) conceived of civil society as a sphere of mediating organizations between the 
individuals and the state. Neo-Tocquevillean scholars not only argue for the positive link between civil society 
and democracy but also advocate for building and strengthening civil society in order to build democracy and 
ensure good governance in third world countries. While de Tocqueville saw civil society as the site of 
decentralization for democratic governance, neo-Tocquevilleans view civil society as a supporting structure in 
the state’s democratization. Associational life is thought to provide social infrastructure for liberal democracy; 
supply the means to limit, resist and curb the excesses of the state and market; present an alternative when they 
fail; facilitate service delivery at the local level; assist in conflict management; deepen democracy; provide a 
voice to disadvantaged groups; and promote economic development (Alagappa, 2004, p. 41). According to the 
neo-Tocquevillean model, efforts to produce democracy through civil society and civic engagement are believed 
to effect change in three ways: first, changes at the micro-social level will produce macro-political results; 
second, in a society, disposition and practices shaped in one association will have spill over effects in other 
circumstances; and third, the same associational structures will operate in similar ways in different socio-
historical contexts (Armony, 2004, p. 7). For detail consult (Tasnim 2012, p 156-157).  
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Civil Society and Politics in Bangladesh: The Search for a Theoretical Lens 
From a general sense, civil society is considered as the sustained, organized social activity 
that occurs in groups that are formed outside the state, the market, and the family (Schwartz 
& Pharr 2003, p.xiii). Civil society is considered to represent the public voice and to 
influence the process of achieving and maintaining democracy by acting at the national and 
grassroots levels. A vigilant civil society in a developing country may contribute to better 
governance and democracy in different ways: through providing civic education, increasing 
interest articulation, monitoring the state apparatus and markets, and ensuring better 
participation and representation of all segments of the society in decision making, aside from 
the polls (Tasnim 2012, p.161). 
Neo-Tocquevillean literature generally considers civil society in idealized terms: 
autonomous, democratic and rich in social capital and civic engagement, always enhancing 
democracy (Diamond1999; Putnum 2000; Salamon 2003). In explaining this theory, 
Diamond (1996, p210) emphasizes the necessity of a vibrant civil society to bring 
institutional reform and fight against corruption and clientelism in a new democracy. Civil 
society is also expected to supplement political parties by stimulating political participation, 
building a better citizenry, and providing leadership training. Ultimately, experience with 
associational life may enrich other democratic values, such as tolerance, moderation, 
compromise and respect for opposing views. These ideal theories give the impression that the 
flow of influence is strictly one-way, from civil society towards political society. However, in 
real life, civil society is often observed to be influenced by political society and the traditional 
norms embedded in the social life. 
In Bangladesh, for example, it is true that group-based micro credit, community-based 
education and health awareness systems introduced by NGOs have had direct positive 
impacts on poverty eradication, literacy and health management (Ullah and Routray 2003; 
Amin 1997; Dowla 2006; Diamond 1999). NGOs actually created a public resource 
distribution system outside the nation state (Nobusue 2002, p 34); in this way, civil society in 
Bangladesh has supplemented the state development policy. However, it is also fact, that civil 
society influenced by conflicting political parties often has become polarized, corrupt and 
ineffective in democratic terms (Quadir 2003). Moreover, CSOs, including the development 
NGOs in Bangladesh, appear to have entered the long patron-client chains running from top 
government leaders down to the periphery of Bangladesh; similarly, NGOs have often been 
accused of becoming new patrons for the poor (Lewis 2004;White 1999; Hashemi 1996). 
Although Bangladesh is ethnically homogenous and casteless, its society is vertically 
constructed and politically polarized. Here, civil society, instead of forming bonds and 
bridging social capital among different groups, helps sharpen existing political divisions 
(Quadir 2003), which have their origins in historical circumstances and have been 
strategically used and generated by political parties (Tasnim, 2007). Thus, in Bangladesh, 
civil society has been behaving in the opposite dimension of what is ideally expected from it 
in relation to democracy. Moreover, civil society is often observed to be compromising its 
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essential watchdog status due to the strong influence of political forces and its accompanying 
loss of independence.  
For Bangladesh, Neo-Tocquevillean assumptions have thus proven to be partly true but 
ultimately inadequate. This requires further exploration for alternative lenses or models 
through which to understand civil society in Bangladesh and, above all, the reasons for its 
failure to contribute to Bangladeshi democracy. 
Although not entirely opposite to the Neo-Tocquevillean school, the Gramscian model 
of civil society provides a better method to understand its relevance to the state and political 
forces. Drawing on but differing from Marx, Antonio Gramsci sees civil society not as a 
counter to the socio-economic base of the state but as part of the political superstructure 
(Alagappa 2004). Gramsci’s hegemony encompasses both the consensual basis of an existing 
political system within civil society and the advancement to a level of class consciousness 
where class is understood not only from an economic point of view but also in terms of a 
common culture and intellectual and moral awareness (Adamson 1980, p. 170-171). 
Gramsci’s conception of civil society includes all social institutions that are non-production-
related, non-governmental, and non-familial, ranging from recreational groups to trade unions 
and from churches to political parties, meaning that there is both a separation and overlap 
between civil society and political spheres. He believes that civil society creates the 
ideological hegemony in the state’s favor. His analysis is clearly historically specific, and his 
main interest is the role of civil society in making capitalism politically viable in cooperation 
with the state’s political apparatus (Khan1998). Gramsci equates the state to the sum of 
political and civil society where both parts are in touch with hegemony. In a capitalist 
society, the state itself oscillates between three positions in relation to civil society, 
simultaneously contrasting with, encompassing and being identical to it (Anderson 1976, p. 
12-13). With the state’s consent, civil society is the manufacturer of and contributor to the 
political hegemony that may be considered the state’s ideological control mechanism. 
Political hegemony is hidden within cultural and ideological discourses and the state’s 
disciplinary method. In explaining his war of position, Gramsci has described the possibility 
of counter-hegemony, where civil society fights not only the coercive methods of the state 
but also its cultural and ideological codification. Gramsci’s idea of civil society may provide 
a better model to understand civil society in Bangladesh, particularly in its relationship with 
the state and politics and its role in democracy. As mentioned above, civil society in 
Bangladesh often mixes with political society. This may be understood better in Gramsci’s 
framework on the state, civil society, political society and hegemony, as well as counter 
hegemony. 
Politicization is a common concept often used in a negative meaning to describe 
political involvement or exertion to control an institution, organization or an administrative 
process, which is ideally thought to be neutral and free from political influences. Moreover, 
government dictates and strong party control upon the organization challenging its autonomy 
is another feature of politicization. Most often, politicization takes place through ideology, 
patronage, corruption and clientelism. When a civil society organization takes politically 
motivated decisions as directed by a party or government and is politically colored by the 
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political affiliation of its members, withholding original objective and interest on which it 
was formed, we may term it as a politicized CSO. Partisanship of the members of the 
organization has a role to play in the politicization process. Partisanship is the party 
identification of citizens. Such identification leads to predictable relationships with their 
perceptions, evaluations and actions in the political process.  
At present, Bangladesh is a liberal economy; however, democracy has yet to be 
stabilized. Political society and political parties are the most powerful and influential 
institutions. The political parties have control over all sections of political, social and even 
economic life. Civil society is no exception. These institutions use vertical means such as 
corruption, patronage, nepotism, and violence to strengthen their support and their control on 
all institutions espousing alternate political ideologies. In the process, civil society has been 
violated, penetrated, polarized, and controlled by political parties (Tasnim, 2007). 
Factionalism and patron-client networks have prepared the basis of social organization (Jahan 
2005, p. 199). These cultures have developed over centuries in rural society and moved into 
urban areas with migration of the rural elites and their entrance into national politics 
(Broomfield 1976, p. 41-60). While the present ruling elites of Bangladesh (belonging to all 
parties) have a moral commitment to Western political philosophies such as democracy or 
socialism, in practice, they rely on the patron-client relationship to run the state and political 
parties (Islam 2001, p. 429). The political leadership of the country, irrespective of ideology 
and party, belongs to the intermediate class that has links both at the urban and rural levels2. 
Political parties co-opt patrons in various localities, who in turn divert their clients’ votes or 
support to particular political parties. Because clients owe allegiance to the patron and not to 
the party, these parties compete with each other to increase their support group of patrons 
(Jahan 2005, p 200). Who are these patrons? In most cases, they are local elites, local council 
members, and more recently leaders of CSOs and development NGOs. They are clients to the 
political parties, the brokers between the government and people. In this manner every 
segment of society, including CSOs, are politicized both at the rural and urban levels.  
According to Bourdieu (1986, p. 249) in all groups there is a system of delegation where a 
single agent or a small group becomes the plenipotentiary, accumulating the totality of social 
capital gained from the collective endeavor. This may be case for a major portion of CSOs in 
Bangladesh, where the CSO leaders, for their personal interest and political gain, turn 
themselves into such brokers for the political parties. 
In contemporary Bangladesh, very few CSOs may be termed neutral. Party loyalty, 
communalism and class distinctions tend to split most CSOs. A vast majority of social 
organizations operating within the private sphere are simply front organizations for various 
political parties. Instead of representing the collective interest of the people, these CSOs are 
mainly engaged in the practice and promotion of the ideas and interests of a given brand of 
                                                             
2Historically, Bengal’s feudal agrarian society was always hierarchical. The agriculture-based vertical patron-
client and kinship network that developed in rural areas was extended to urban areas. The same rural elites who 
influenced the social and economic life of the peasants later became the urban political leaders and have served 
as an intermediate political class. During and after the British colonial period, Bangladesh society was 
penetrated by formal political institutions headed by these politicians, who used their vertical networks to 
maintain their influence in society (Broomfield, 1976, p. 41-60). 
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politics (Quadir 2003, p. 432). In the process, it appears that civil society has become 
politicized and has compromised its vigilance and autonomy, which is negatively affecting 
the democratization process. 
Political Parties and Politicized Civil Society in Bangladesh 
In the first 18 years of independence, Bangladesh politics faced government turnovers and 
military coup d’états with no party competition; for this reason, there was a monopoly of a 
section of politicians, bureaucrats, military leaders and their parties. Insecure political and 
economic institutions led the different factions to use patronage and clientelism to build and 
maintain an organizational base. After the end of the autocratic rule of General Ershad in 
1990 and the reintroduction of the parliamentary system of government, a competitive but 
confrontational party system has been observed in Bangladesh. The two major parties are the 
left-centric Awami League (AL), which is aligned with other, smaller left-wing parties, and 
the right-centric Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), which is aligned with other Islamic-
minded parties (Hossain 2000, p. 520, N. Ahmed 2003, p. 60). Both parties had an equal 
probability of winning a general election and forming a cabinet with their coalition partners if 
the election was free and fair. Since 1991, BNP and AL have served as the government twice 
each alternately (BNP, 1991-1996 and 2001-2006 and AL, 1996-2001, 2008-present) with 
their coalition or supporting partners. However, in 2014 through a controversial general 
election, AL continues its regime. 
Because both major political parties are centrist, they seem to have converged into 
catch-all parties3 (Katz and Mair1995; Kirchheimer 1966) with no radical or identifying 
ideologies concerning national and/or foreign policy. These parties now attract supporters 
from all segments of society who show allegiance to their policies. Both parties accept a 
capitalist economic system and democracy. The ideological differences among them are not 
based in liberalism or socialism but rather in history and the debate over the inclusion of 
religion in politics.  
Political culture or practice has yet to reach the level where the parties are ready to 
engage in politics within democratic rules and norms. They calculate politics as a zero-sum 
game. Therefore, these parties always underestimate each other’s political strength and seek 
to establish monopolistic rule by simply knocking out the other party, believing that the 
losing party will simply fade away (Hossain 2000, p. 521). At the end of each party’s term of 
office, several factions appear that struggle internally for their share of patronage, power and 
party tickets to contest the next election. 
                                                             
3Kirchheimer (1966, p. 185) argued that class line parties and integrating mass parties (Duverger, 1978) have 
gone through a transformation and become more effective in electoral terms. These parties have turned into 
catch-all parties embracing a nationwide clientele. They began to make broader appeals, trying to gain 
supportfrom all classes (Katz and Mair 1995, p. 12). Only major parties can become successful catch-all parties. 
The catch-all party finds its permanent clientele among the interest groups although they also represent citizens 
beyond group activities (Kirchheimer, 1966, p. 194). In Third World countries, nationalist mass parties often 
transformed into catch-all parties as they gained victory over colonial powers, were elected to rule, and engaged 
in state and nation building. 
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Moreover, the internal organization and decision-making processes of each party are 
neither democratic nor decentralized. Practically, parties are organized around the center of 
their symbolic leader, who uses the charisma of his or her predecessor. The chair persons of 
most parties enjoy widespread powers, including the power to take unilateral action (Ahmed 
2003, p.61, Jahan 2015, p. 148). 
Instead of a formal and horizontal relationship with these parties, civil society seems to 
maintain a vertical, informal relationship (Tasnim 2007, p. 24). The local leaders, CSOs, and 
NGOs are clients to the state and patrons to the citizens and villagers (Islam 2001,p. 213). 
Such relationships bring CSOs favors for the group, such as project sanctions, financial 
grants, and jobs, as well as personal favors, including government loans, employment, 
promotions, business grants and licenses, government contracts, legal aid, and even medical 
help. In return, the government and political parties receive loyalty and support from different 
sections of the social strata, financial and logistic support during elections, control over 
different institutions and even the media, and ensure the necessary organizational base for 
staging mass protests. Such politicization, as opposed to political penetration, is observed 
among all types of CSOs, urban and rural-based, traditional and modern. 
Traditional organizations such as labor unions, professional associations, university 
groups, chambers of commerce and even newspapers are identified primarily by their 
political affiliations. With few exceptions, most of these CSOs belong to one of the major 
three ideological camps- Secularist, Nationalist and Islamist (Quadir and Tsujinaka 2015, p 
11). The ruling party, whether the AL or BNP, has shown through its decisions and actions 
that it gives special support and rewards to those CSOs that gave positive assistance in 
helping that party win its election, and acts directly against the CSOs that collaborated with 
the opposition. Labor union leaders, rather than promoting workers’ interests, are motivated 
to take undue advantage from their position or concentrate on forming links with political 
parties or higher government functionaries (Zafarullah 2003, p. 295). 
Political penetration is also observed in rural society. In their study on the change in the 
contemporary rural power structure in Bangladesh, Faruque et al. (2007) revealed interesting 
changes where links with political parties were shown to be the most important factor in rural 
power sources; previously, it was the possession of landed property, family heritage, and 
wealth. Another significant change within rural society is the emerging new type of grouping 
and rivalry, reflecting the polarization and confrontation found in national politics. 
Modern development NGOs and their apex organization, the Association for 
Development Agencies in Bangladesh (ADAB)4, were considered neutral or apolitical to a 
point. However, political conflict ultimately led to divisions within this NGO community too 
(Hossain 2006). While the NGOs at the national level are politically divided, at the local level 
they have been identified as the new patrons of the poor, both as direct providers of micro-
credit and as mediators between the poor and other power structures. Among the intellectual 
                                                             
4 ADAB at present is totally dysfunctional, instead the Federation of NGOs in Bangladesh (FNB) 
http://www.ngofederationbd.net/index.php (Accessed 4 November 2016) has earned the position to represent all 
the institutions.   
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and professional groups, it is the university professors and lawyers who are at the extreme of 
political division and factions. Professors join the conflicting political blocs for personal gain 
and power as well as ideology and thus lose the strength to monitor the university 
administration or the government. The lawyers’ associations in Bangladesh are equally 
politicized. Our discussion so far gives us an overview of the politicized civil society at the 
national level. 
These matters, however anecdotally true, have yet to be empirically investigated and 
analyzed. The present study will avoid extreme cases, instead examining typical CSOs 
belonging to important sectors of civil society and working at the periphery level, to analyze 
their politicized nature. 
Methodology 
Among different case study strategies, basically the ‘explanation building through multiple 
case studies’ method (Yin 2003, 121-2)5 has been adopted for this research. To verify the 
propositions about politicized civil society in Bangladesh, this paper systematically uses in-
depth observation, newspaper reports, documents provided by CSOs, information revealed 
through interviews and group discussions with CSO personnel, members and leaders of four 
CSOs in the district of Rajshahi, known as the centre of the North Zone of Bangladesh. The 
Rajshahi district was selected because it best represents Bangladesh civil society at the 
periphery and meso level in terms of urban-rural distribution, social composition, education, 
economy, and administrative importance6. These case studies were conducted in addition to a 
survey on CSOs where 504 CSOs from eight categories were interviewed with structured 
questionnaire7. To validate the quantitative survey data8, it was necessary to conduct in depth 
                                                             
5 In a multiple-case study, one goal is to build a general explanation that fits each of the individual cases, even 
though the cases will vary in their details. The objective is analogous to multiple experiments (Yin 2003, 121). 
 
6Because Rajshahi is a divisional town, divisional headquarters of all administrative offices, as well as district 
branch offices of private companies, banks, educational institutions and NGOs, are found here. Again, because 
the district is the center for higher education in the northern zone and strata, it provides a space for associational 
activities. CSOs that are active here, particularly in the urban areas, represent the CSOs active at the meso level 
of the nation. Again, like almost all of Bangladesh, Rajshahi’s economy, in spite of being a divisional district, is 
mostly agrarian (19.5%), with little significant industry (7%) or business. Agriculture at the national level 
contributes 20.4% to the GDP. Seventy-six percent of the national population lives in rural areas; similarly, 67% 
of households in Rajshahi are farm households. The national literacy rate in 2006 (45%), resembles Rajshahi’s 
literacy rate (47.4%). Naturally, rural and community based societies in Rajshahi have a high possibility of 
representing the peripheral area of Bangladesh(Source: Statistical Year Book of Bangladesh, 2004, 2005). 
 
7All registered or enlisted CSOs in the district, representing eight categories—cooperative organizations, 
voluntary social organizations, NGOs, youth groups, labour unions, trade organizations, professional 
associations, and university-centric organizations—were regarded as the survey population, totaling 3,768 
organizations (Tasnim, 2007, p. 11). The sample size was selected through a stratified random sampling process: 
1,227 organizations were selected randomly, representing 30% of each category. Ultimately, representatives of 
504 CSOs were interviewed, resulting in a return rate of 41%. Each CSO was directly interviewed using a 
structured questionnaire that included 30 questions along with sub-questions and long lists of answer options. 
Questions were specifically designed to reveal the policy influences and interests of the target groups and their 
relationship with the government, political sphere and other important sectors of the society and political 
system. 
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case studies. These four CSOs were carefully9 selected for representing the most common 
types of CSOs as well as both service providing and advocacy groups active at the local level. 
Rajshahi Sugar Mill Labor Union represents the trade unions, Pahar Pur Ideal Farmers’ 
Cooperative represents the cooperatives, Thengamara Mahila Shobuj Shongho represents the 
NGO sector and Movement to Protect Rajshahi City represents the local advocacy groups. To 
represent professional CSOs, a nationally-based movement was selected; a movement for 
genuine and logical demands by the society’s most respected but powerless professionals –
Primary School Teachers of Bangladesh. Selected supplementary and follow up interviews 
were conducted in 2012 to confirm the data collected in 2006.  
With these five case studies, this paper attempts to reveal the actual relationship 
between civil society and politics and identify the reasons behind the weak contributions of 
Bangladesh’s civil society to its democracy. 
Selected Case Studies 
This section provides brief case studies of five types of CSOs: trade unions, cooperatives, 
development NGOs, citizen groups and professional groups. All five CSO types are very 
different from one other in nature, function, size, and membership, and each represents the 
interests of a different segment of society. Each case study among the first four (trade union, 
cooperative, development NGO and citizen group) focuses on four main points: an overview 
of the CSO, membership patterns and election, the relationship between leaders and 
members, and the nature of its interactions with politics and/or the government. These points 
were selected with the intent to understand the democratic nature of CSOs, their autonomy, 
and their positions in relation to local or national politics and democracy. The fifth case study 
is on a movement of a professional group, primary teachers, at the national level that is 
responding to some very basic demands that they have yet to fulfill. The movement reached 
its peak in 2006. This case study is mostly based on content analysis of newspaper reports 
and articles published on the movement and the issue raised in 2006 and later. 
Through these very different case studies, the paper shows that, at whatever level civil 
society is working and with whatever degree of human and financial resources, political links 
are always important for an individual group’s existence, maintenance and success. In the 
process, groups often lose their independence and compromise their watchdog roles. What is 
true for an individual CSO is also true for a nation-wide CSO movement. 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
8 Quantitative analysis of the survey data gathered from the 504 CSOs has been published in another research 
paper (Tasnim 2012) in 2012. The present paper and the paper published in 2012 (Tasnim, 2012), both are based 
on author’s PhD research titled ‘Civil Society in Bangladesh: Vibrant but not Vigilant’. 
9 After going through the answers in the filled in questionnaires, the survey notes submitted by the surveyors 
and their daily reports during the time of the survey, these four CSOs from different categories were purposively 
selected for further in-depth study. They were purposively selected as these four CSOs had been considered 
best, for their size, structure, functions, membership and objectives, among the surveyed CSOs to represent each 
category.  
Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.9, No.1, 2017  107 
 
 
I. Rajshahi Sugar Mill Labor Union10 
The Rajshahi Sugar Mill Labor and Workers Union has been registered under the Ministry of 
Labor and Employment since 1967 and represents 1,234 members. Its main objective is 
protecting the workers’ interests and bargaining with the authorities for improved wages, 
pensions, financial security, and insurance for ill and injured workers, which they achieve 
through a variety of methods, including striking. The union’s major funding sources are 
membership fees, entrance fees, monthly fees, special fees, subsidy from the authorities and 
income from union property. The union liaises with the other sugar mill labor unions, which 
are joined under a federation, and the labor unions of other industrial sectors.  
All laborers and workers at the Rajshahi Sugar Mill, with the exception of security 
guards and office assistants in the confidential section, are eligible to become voting 
members of the union with the right to run in union elections. The union is run by a 23-
member executive committee, 17 of whom are elected directly by the general membership 
every two years. The committee, following constitutional rules, works to implement union 
objectives. The executive committee is responsible for the union’s financial affairs and 
recruiting necessary staff to run the union office. Financial decisions are made by a majority 
vote of the committee; they also have jurisdiction over matters not directly addressed in the 
union constitution. However, the most important responsibility of the committee is 
bargaining with the mill authorities.  
The elected president of the executive committee is called the collective bargaining 
leader. He is very powerful and has immense influence over the workers and other mill 
officers. Upon election, he no longer works in the mill and maintains a well-furnished office 
superior even to the office of the mill’s general manager. The status of the elected leader and 
committee members is very different from that of a normal worker. Members of the 
committee bargain on behalf of the rest of the workers for higher wages and other perks. 
However, the voting system brings a democratic atmosphere in the union, especially during 
elections, which are conducted by secret ballot. Practically, it has been observed that the 
labor leader who supports the ruling party or those who are supported by the ruling political 
leaders usually take over the actual power of the union and sometimes control of the whole 
mill management. Even if these leaders do not hold an elected post within the union, their 
influence and power are found everywhere. The de facto presence and power of these 
politically linked elected and non-elected labor leaders often challenges the de jure 
legitimacy of the elected committee. Each department of the mill administration has to move 
according to the wishes of the labor leaders. 
It has been found that this particular trade union is neither totally controlled by the 
political parties nor is it independent of them. During executive committee elections, slates 
are formed based on party lines that reflect national politics. However, although one slate 
                                                             
10 This case study is based on field visits, interviews with the labor union leader, group discussions with other 
workers and officers and union documentation (e.g. union constitution, election results) provided by the 
Rajshahi Sugar Mill Labor Union Office.  
108  Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.9, No.1, 2017 
 
may be marked as BNP and another as AL, candidates supporting other political parties (like 
some communist factions, for example) may also be found on these slates. In most cases, the 
ruling party slate has significant influence among union members and the administration. 
However, there is no permanent voters’ bank for each slate. The voters’ decisions change 
with changes in national politics and the performance of the union president11. Examining the 
list of elected members and their political affiliations for 2001, 2003 and 200512 shows that 
the election results reflected national politics: in 2001, when AL was in power, 10 of the 
elected members were from the AL while 6 were from the BNP. Conversely, when the BNP 
was in power in 2003 and 2005, the distribution was just the opposite, with 9 BNP and 7 AL 
candidates elected in 2003 and 13 BNP and 4 AL candidates elected in 2005. Central political 
leaders of the Rajshahi District such as parliament members and local mayors have a direct 
influence on the recruitment process, determining sugar prices and calling tenders for selling 
sugar. Naturally an oligarchic tendency, intensified by high profile political links, develops 
within the executive committee.  
The Rajshahi Sugar Mill Labor and Workers Union represents a medium-sized, hardly 
profitable government industry labor group that is active in a region far from the nation’s 
central production zone. Their financial power is far inferior to that of labor unions working 
in the political and economic center; however, they are still highly politicized and controlled 
by political powers. Power and control of those labor leaders blessed by the ruling party 
(which has alternated every five years since 1990) indicates its lack of autonomy. When 
government-supported leaders control the administration, their bargaining power for the 
common workers and labor is lessened. These leaders are often found to be more concerned 
with their own (close inner circle’s) personal benefit and patronage than with the collective 
interest of the labor community. 
II. Pahar Pur Adarsho Shomobai Krishok Samity (Pahar Pur Ideal Farmers’ Cooperative)13 
In Bangladesh, there are several varieties of cooperatives with different statuses and financial 
power at different levels of rural and urban society, although their most common purpose is 
to provide loans. These cooperatives are generally organized in two tiers, with village 
cooperatives at the periphery and a central cooperative located in each sub-district. The 
central cooperative committee is elected by the periphery cooperatives. Such cooperatives are 
mostly made up of farmers but also by poor laborers, workers, fishers, small businessmen and 
even the destitutes. Primary cooperatives are formed by 20 to 40 members at the village level; 
these groups each elect one member to the college of electorate, which ultimately elects the 
members who are sent to the central committee at the union level14. In rural areas, a prime 
objective of cooperatives is providing small loans (5 to 20 thousand BDT)15to farmers, 
fishermen, and small businessmen. The cooperative examined here is a typical periphery 
                                                             
11 Group discussion with mill workers and mill engineer during a field visit on 26th September 2006.  
12 As provided by the office of the labor union. 
13 The case study was developed based on a field visit to Bagmara during September, 2006, information 
provided by the chairperson in a survey questionnaire, and through personal interviews, participation at the 
cooperative meetings as well as observation note provided by the surveyor responsible for surveying this 
particular CSO. 
14 Interview with the BRDB Officer, Poba Sub-district, 9th October, 2006.  
15Bangladeshi Currency  named -Taka valued at approximately USD 70-300.  
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cooperative of 35 members, all of whom are male farmers. The cooperative is active in the 
Bhobanaigonj union under the Bagmara sub-district in Rajshahi. It was established and 
registered in 1984. Paharpur Cooperative is supervised by the local officers of the Bangladesh 
Rural Development Board (BRDB). It is a stable and long-running cooperative with a yearly 
budget of 150,000 TK, approximately USD 20,205. This is rather a large budget compared to 
the budgets of other cooperatives in the area.  
First, the 35 farmers had to form a common capital stock with their personal savings, at 
which point they began to receive loans from BRDB with the supervision of the BRDB 
officers. Members use their loans mainly for agriculture and irrigation purposes. Election 
rules specify that a 6-member committee for the cooperative shall be elected every year. 
However, there have been no elections for some time, and the cooperative has been run by 
the same chairperson for many years; the chairperson is a popular figure and was elected by 
his fellow members to the Electoral College. He was ultimately elected as the chairperson to 
the central cooperative active at the Bagmara sub-district, Rajshahi.  
The cooperative is involved in social activities unrelated to granting loans, such as 
planting seedlings and sending members for skill training. Compared to other members of the 
cooperative, the chairperson, an active supporter of the ruling political party, is relatively 
better off economically and socially. With the help of BRDB officials and his personal 
connections to political leaders, the chairperson brought significant sums of money and social 
projects to the cooperative, something that has been possible chiefly due to his position in the 
central cooperative and his relationships with outside political figures.  
Because the chairperson of the Paharpur Cooperative is directly involved in politics, he 
also led the cooperative into political participation. The cooperative chairperson and members 
were involved in different election-related functions, such as supporting and campaigning for 
a particular candidate and participating in programs to raise political awareness. However, 
their activities and functions never lead them to participate in policy-making. Rather than 
forming coalitions with other cooperatives or sending petitions, they prefer to take their 
problems directly to the leaders of the ruling party, the BRDB office or the sub-district 
administrative office. The cooperative members have virtually no network or understanding 
with other local social or economic actors, even with local NGOs. The chairperson admitted 
that before they were politically connected, the cooperative faced problems such as 
corruption, a lack of government cooperation and bureaucratic obstructions over loans and 
registration. These problems were solved when they showed their political support to the 
ruling party. The chairperson admitted frankly that the political identity of the cooperative 
and/or its leader does matter in official decisions to sanction loans and provide other 
government services.  
In most cases, cooperatives represent the farmers who contribute the most to the 
agrarian economy of Bangladesh. However, their associations hardly act as any strong 
pressure or professional group. Cooperatives are scarcely involved in advocacy activities 
because their members’ main objectives are economic benefit, not networking or civic 
engagement. According to the Cooperative Rule of 2004, in its initial two years of existence, 
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no cooperative has the right to make any demand to the government. In addition, farmers’ 
ignorance and the strong political pressure on cooperative leaders have led to weak 
cooperatives in relation to participation, vigilance, and democracy. Local CSOs, such as 
cooperatives and local welfare clubs, have the potential to develop collective unity, social and 
political consciousness among citizens, but they lack the necessary resources and guidance. 
Civil society researchers and donors have hardly considered them as a force for civil society, 
but they have been successfully targeted by political parties as a means to penetrate rural 
society.  
III.Thengamara Mahila Shobuj Shongho (TMSS) [Thengamara (name of a particular area in 
Northern Bangladesh) Women’s Green Group]16 
Thengamara Mahila Shobuj Shongho (TMSS) is a well-established development NGO. It was 
first formed in 1980 by local organizers and later received foreign funding and support. 
TMSS is neither as large nor as famous as Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee 
(BRAC) or the Grameen Bank, but is one of the top ten NGOs of Bangladesh (Stiles 2002, p. 
50). Although it has its origins in the northern region of the country, it is now working 
nationwide in traditional micro-credit and other social welfare activities, including, health, 
micro-finance, business promotion, education, and human rights and gender equality. The 
interest rate for a TMSS loan is 12.5% and 10% for the extremely poor. Among its 47 
development partners, 16 are international development agencies or foreign embassies.  
At the local level, like other development NGOs, micro-credit and other social services 
are provided collectively to a small group of beneficiaries. Each basic group is made up of 
10-30 women. Weekly meetings are held where micro-credit as well as other social issues, 
such as sanitation, the environment and women's rights, are discussed. TMSS is centrally 
governed by an executive committee of 15 members who are elected by the general members 
of TMSS every three years; the general committee includes the chair of every TMSS basic 
group that has been active for at least three years, plus one or two local elites from each area 
in which TMSS is active. Members of the general committee representing all zones, vote for 
the members of the executive committee. Although the process seems to be reasonably 
democratic, a closer look at the member list in the 2005 TMSS Annual Report shows that 
only two genuine beneficiaries working at the periphery have been able to enter the executive 
committee. Practically, regardless of what the system is, the charisma of the founding 
director, Professor Hosne Ara Begum, plays an important role in managing and expanding 
the NGO, which is true of many other large NGOs in Bangladesh. Charisma plays an 
important role in the health and development of large organizations in Bangladesh, just as it 
does in Bangladeshi party politics.  
As understood from conversations and field visits, TMSS works similarly to other 
development NGOs, with a hierarchical management system in which field workers are 
trained in the central or zonal offices and then sent to the fields. At basic group meetings, the 
                                                             
16 The case study is based on a visit to the TMSS Rajshahi Zonal office, an interview with the officer in charge 
on 12th October 2006, the 2005 TMSS Annual Report, and the TMSS website, http://www.tmss-
bd.org/index.html (accessed 5 August, 2007). The updates are made from visiting the NGO’s website and 
information collected from the electronic media. 
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assigned TMSS field worker coordinates the meeting agenda, decides how the meeting will 
proceed, and collects the members’ weekly contributions and loan installments. NGO staff 
functions do not provide any scope for considering the beneficiaries as equal members of the 
NGO staff, nor can staff consider themselves equal to members; the relationship is more akin 
to that of a service provider and receiver. Theoretically, it is expected that through the efforts 
of the NGO staff over time, the economic empowerment and development awareness of the 
beneficiaries will allow groups to function autonomously. Practically, there are very few 
instances of such independence. The same comment may be made for the basic unit groups of 
other development NGOs. 
TMSS maintains all of the necessary formal relationships with the government, 
participating in monthly coordination meetings with administrative district and sub-district 
heads and also at the national level with the NGO Bureau. The NGO often exchanges 
opinions and share problems and advice on rural development with the administration, as 
well as submitting formal reports. However, this is done in a hierarchical way: field workers 
convey their opinions to the branch managers, who pass them on to their managers. In this 
way, opinions are carried to the zonal and central offices and finally into consultation with 
the relevant government agencies and donors.  
TMSS belongs to a group of NGOs known as Federation of NGOs in Bangladesh 
(FNB). From the point of view of national politics and the politicization of NGOs, according 
to NGO officials interviewed, TMSS tries to remain neutral. They admitted, however, that it 
has become difficult to work in a politicized and polarized environment. Naturally, large 
NGOs enter into significant contracts with the government on different social welfare 
projects. Often such joint ventures by NGOs are considered as political actions by the 
opposition, and when the opposition comes to power, NGOs who cooperated with the 
previous administration are blacklisted by the new one. Parties cannot carry all the blame 
here; NGO leaders have also made politicized decisions, and there are tensions between 
different NGOs themselves. Moreover, NGOs are neither totally transparent nor free from 
internal problems. Taking all these together, it may soon become impossible to run a NGO 
without the shelter of a major political party. Interviews were originally undertaken during 
the BNP regime. Under the present AL regime, when the TMSS website was revisited, it was 
found that TMSS is maintaining good relations with the present regime and inviting ministers 
and top AL leaders to their workshops and other events in 2012. In a recently televised 
popular Talk Show (Tritiyo Matra, 2016)17, TMSS leader Hosne Ara Begum, who is 
considered as a highly successful NGO personality, through her conversation, has reaffirmed 
the same position of the NGOs and situation of politics, politicization and corruption at the 
national level. 
After 2001, donor backing was not sufficient for NGOs to pursue their projects 
uninterruptedly. Moreover, at the local level, political divisions have created a panic among 
the small NGOs. In this situation, NGOs must please their patron-donors as well as the ruling 
and opposition parties and avoid all actions that may go against the interest of either party. 
                                                             
17 Also available on YouTube  Accessed in 20 October, 2016 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4hPqMWsOrN0 
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Naturally, this limits the NGOs’ freedom of action, especially in regard to participation and 
democracy. 
In the meantime the NGOs have entered their new phase of marketization and 
hybridization where the small NGOs depend  more on their micro-credit business and big 
NGOs have entered the private sector in the name of social business (Lewis 2016, pp26-27). 
Such finance oriented professionalism has brought the NGOs away from their advocacy and 
participatory performance. TMSS, like other big NGOs (such as ASA, BRAC etc.) have 
entered into social businesses including tertiary education18. 
IV. Rajshahi Rakkah Shangram Parishod-RRSP (Movement to Protect Rajshahi City) 
Rajshahi Rakkah Shangram Parishod-RRSP (Movement to Protect Rajshahi City) is a local 
citizens’ group organized by the middle class and elites of Rajshahi City with the aim of 
protecting the interests of the area, particularly Rajshahi City. The movement began in 1997, 
and the group advocates for the provision of basic services, including medical treatment, 
water supplies, power supplies, and gas supplies for the people of Rajshahi, as well as for 
concerns over local environmental degradation and against government decisions to move 
important offices and building out of Rajshahi. The groups also indicate irregularities, 
corruption, and administrative failures. They articulate their interests through petitions, press 
conferences, round tables, seminars, public meetings, rallies, sit-ins, hunger strikes, and all-
out strikes19. In addition to membership fees, other sources of finance include donations from 
prominent local businessmen and sponsor organizations such as banks, enterprises and 
national dailies. 
Originally, RRSP was formed by a few merchants in the town, but it has come to attract 
members from all types of professionals, including teachers, intellectuals, journalists, lawyers 
and other educated citizens. The membership pattern, executive committee, and advisory 
committee are governed by a written constitution. The executive committee is elected every 
two years by the members. Any citizen of Rajshahi may become a member of RRSP, 
although only 140 citizens are formal members. It also has a 20-member advisory committee 
comprised of local elites from Rajshahi City. In addition, RRSP is able to ensure the 
participation of a considerable number of members and prominent citizens in the different 
events and activities organized by RRSP (Proceeding of the Round Table Meeting, Rajshahi 
Rokkah Shongram Parishad, 2006) 
RRSP is a group of like-minded citizens belonging to the same social class, and the 
relationship between the leaders and members is thus mostly congenial. It has been observed 
that many members are not active within the organization. The executive committee makes 
decisions to organize seminars and rallies and stage protests. All petitions sent to the 
authorities are also decided by this committee. When the RRSP faces any difficulties, it turns 
to its members’ personal networks and the organization’s relationship with other professional 
groups such as bar and teachers’ associations, as well as consulting with its advisory 
                                                             
18 TMSS runs a good number of private tertiary educational institutes, colleges and university in the fields of 
medicine, nursing, vocational, IT technology, commerce and so on. 
19 Interview with the convener, Rajshahi Shohor Rokkah Shongram Porishad, Rajshahi, 28th September, 2006. 
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committee. In 2006, it was the convener and not the chairperson who was the most active in 
the name of RRSP. The same person has been found to be the most active leader in 2012 and 
2016. Although this citizen group is working in the interest of Rajshahi, in 2006 it had found 
itself in an antagonistic position in relation to the Rajshahi City Corporation, governed by the 
elected mayor, who was a member of the ruling BNP party. In 2005 and 2006, RRSP had 
become active in pointing out the irregularities found in the administration and protested 
against government policies concerning Rajshahi. It further came into direct conflict with the 
administration by protesting patient maltreatment in private clinics. The convener was even 
arrested and tortured by law enforcement forces20, which attracted the attention of the 
national media. The organization claims that they have relationships with neither political 
parties nor any political blocs; rather, they say they have come forward for the interest of the 
citizens of Rajshahi because the political parties have failed to do so. To counteract the 
popularity of RRSP, the ruling party in 2006, have supported the formation of new citizens’ 
groups; however, those groups lack proper organizational strength and the necessary citizen 
support. RRSP has an excellent relationship with the press and other non-political groups. 
The organization has gained recognition and media attention for its efforts to bring natural 
gas supply to the city.  
If we examine the RSPP’s advisory committee membership lists, we see the presence of 
well-reputed citizens of Rajshahi City who represent both the BNP (but not Jamat-i- Islami) 
bloc and the AL and left wing bloc, although most members belong to the latter (Proceeding 
of the Round Table Meeting, Rajshahi Rokkah Shongram Parishad, 2006). The secretary of 
RRSP, despite claims of being non-political, was an elected member of the Board of 
Directorates of the Rajshahi Chamber of Commerce during the AL regime (Annual Report 
2002) and had relationships with left wing organizations as a youth. In 2006, he was in a 
position of confrontation with the BNP and Jamat-led administration. During conversations 
with other citizens about RRSP, it was discovered that the organization and its actions have 
been praised by the citizens, but the presence of larger numbers of AL and left bloc members 
has discouraged BNP-aligned and religious citizens to engage with the group directly. For 
example, in the seminars organized by RRSP, significant numbers of AL-left bloc university 
professors participated as presenters. Additionally, the elites and civil society leaders who 
supported the ruling coalition are already favored by the government and administration and, 
due to the loyalty they sold for personal benefit, have prevented them (BNP and conservative 
blocs) from joining any movement that protests government policy. The polarization that has 
divided society has also barred citizens from organizing systematic, united movements. 
Unless there is a balance among both the blocs and truly non-political citizens groups are 
established, there can be no real change. In 2012, under the AL regime, RRSP is still active; 
however, it now enjoys the blessing of the local parliament member representing the leftwing 
(Bangladesh Worker’s Party) coalition of the AL block (Prothom Alo, Nov 13, 2012). The 
citizen group enjoys same type of blessing in 2016 as the same party is in power and the 
member of the parliament for the local area is also the same person. 
 
                                                             
20 As admitted by the Secretary of Rajshahi  Rakkha Shongram Parishod, interviewed on 28th September 2006.  
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V The Primary School Teachers’ Movement of 2006 21 
In Bangladesh, movements formed by people and groups taking to the streets and agitating to 
make their demands heard, have always been considered democratic and as an important way 
of establishing rights and bringing about change. This Gramscian tradition in Bangladesh is 
older than its birth. The government and administration in Bangladesh have failed to develop 
into responsive institutions. Among the political and social movements taking place from 
1990 to 2006, this section shall focus on a particular professional organization’s fight for its 
interests: the primary school teachers’ movement of 2006. The movement’s uniqueness lies 
in its polarized character and the way it was handled by the government. 
The primary school teachers’ association is considered to be a highly organized and 
well-networked group in Bangladesh. Such associations are found in every sub-district, 
district and division, all the way to the national level. They also have geographically based 
ranked leadership within the various primary school categories, including government 
schools, non-government schools, community schools, and madrasas. Elections are held 
regularly among these organizations, and each group is factionalized along party lines. Since 
independence, the school teachers’ community has engaged in movements of varying scales 
on different issues, though most often for pay raises. Bangladeshi school teachers are poorly 
paid, with little or no allowances for housing or medical treatment. However, because school 
teachers’ groups are active and networked from the national to the local levels and because 
teachers are the traditional opinion leaders in rural areas, they have attracted the attention of 
local elites and national political parties. The 2006 protests focused on demanding better 
salaries and facilities and the nationalization of non-government primary schools.  
After the reintroduction of democracy in 1990, the school teachers first approached the 
government (at that time, the BNP) with their demands in 1994. The opposition leader, the 
chairperson of the AL, promised association leaders that the AL would fulfill their demands 
if elected to power. Once the AL was elected in 1996, however, no initiative was taken to 
solve the teachers’ problems; consequently, teachers began agitating for change in 2000 as 
the AL’s tenure was drawing to a close. The authorities entered into negotiations with the 
teachers, which ultimately ended in the authorities’ favor. Thus, the teachers began protesting 
again, staging large demonstrations and hunger strikes (Ittefaque, 6 June 2001). The 
opposition leader, then the chairperson of the BNP, promised to fulfill teachers’ demands if 
the BNP was successful in the 2001 election22, and in September 2001, the BNP formed the 
government. In 2006, the final year of the BNP-Jamat government, the teachers’ groups were 
                                                             
21 A search of the Ittefaque, Daily Star and Jugantor newspapers from May to August 2006 finds 69 reports and 
editorials on the primary school teachers’ movement. 29 of these reports were removed from the sample due to 
their duplicate reporting, leaving a sample size of 41 reports. This newspaper analysis is based on hardcopy 
newspaper reports were collected from Public Library, National Press Institute and National Library & 
Archives, Dhaka, in 2007. The updated section is based on newspaper reports available online. 
  
22 Again in 2006, at the critical stage of the primary teachers’ movement, the opposition, AL and its left-wing 
allies, showed support to the leaders and promised to realize all their demand if elected. 
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still engaged in negotiations with the government for providing higher salaries and other 
facilities, but they found that the draft national budget (the last budget before the election) 
had not allocated the necessary funds for meeting their demands, leaving the teachers once 
again as little more than tools used by a party to win the next election (Jugantor 18 June 
2006). This time, however, the teachers were prepared for an all-out movement. Organized 
by 41 apex teachers’ associations, about 800,000 teachers were involved, directly or 
indirectly, in the 2006 movement. They arranged enormous demonstrations at the capital and 
sit-ins in front of the secretariat, hunger strikes at important squares of the city and lastly, 
went on a full-fledged strike, keeping 25,000 schools closed throughout the country for 30 
days and depriving 15 million children of their school time. They also attempted to block the 
roads and waterways in every district, which is a tactic common to violent labor unions, 
students, and anomic groups. The teachers’ key demands, which by this time encompassed 
primary, secondary and madrasa teachers, were 1) the nationalization of non-government 
primary teachers’ jobs; 2) matched government salaries for teachers in non-government 
secondary schools and colleges; 3) the elimination of wage discrimination in favor of 
government primary school teachers; 4) the nationalization of community primary schools; 
and 4) the incorporation of ebtedayee (a type of small private madrasa) teachers into the 
national pay scale (Daily Star 5 July, 2006). Different groups within the teachers’ coalition 
also harbored specific demands.  
The teachers’ coalition included groups linked to both the BNP and AL, and daily news 
briefings on the protests indicate that each of the different associations harbored factions that 
leaned towards the ruling party or the opposition. Although these factions were all fighting 
for the same cause, they announced programs separately and carried out events in different 
public squares in the capital. For example, when the community school teachers declared a 
hunger strike to the death, the pro-BNP faction observed it in Muktangon (Open Square), 
while the pro-Awami League faction started their strike in the central Shaheed Minar 
(Monument Square) (Daily Star, 20 June, 2007).  
These all-out protests were the result of teachers’ long neglect by the party government, 
both the BNP and AL. The teachers’ demands gained strength when they were supported by 
the opposition party, which made electoral promises that it never kept. During the 2006 
movement, the opposition AL and its aligned left bloc backed the teachers, giving more force 
to the movement. For its part, the BNP-Jamat government allowed the violent movement to 
continue unchecked for months, hampering national education throughout the country 
because 2006 was the final year of its five-year term. The government could not meet all the 
teachers’ demands, the costs of which ran to approximately 1 billion 500 million BDT, a sum 
that the state exchequer was not ready to provide. The government instead took the policy of 
delaying through dialogue with the protesting groups. The Education Minister took the 
approach of meeting with different factions separately and agreeing to demands 
conditionally. Naturally, BNP-linked factions accepted the government’s halfhearted 
response to negotiations, while others did not. Some sections of the teacher’s group went 
back to school empty-handed after their long strike; others lost the strength to remain in the 
streets. The unity of the movement was broken. A handful of non-government primary school 
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teachers’ groups linked to the AL remained in the streets until September, but the movement 
had lost its force. Media attention refocused on more violent protests by other anomic groups 
on different issues and the street politics that the opposition had just begun when the 8th 
Parliament had only a few remaining days. 
Update: From January 2009, the newly elected AL formed the government, however, 
this new AL regime failed to fulfill their election manifesto to regularize the jobs of the non-
government primary school teachers. Naturally, again the primary school teachers of 24000 
schools had to call for a strike, and came down to the streets with long processions, which 
were met with brutal police obstruction leading to injuries. Finally, dialogue took place on 23 
September 2012 between the Ministry of Education and school teachers with no tangible 
result (The Daily Star, 16 January, 16 May, 17 May, 18 May, 5 October, 2012,). However, on 
10 January 2013 the announcement came from the Prime Minister’s side, on the 
government’s decision to nationalize 26,193 private primary schools  within 2013 (Daily 
Star, 10 January, 2013).   
It should be mentioned that at this stage, in 2013, it had become an interest for the 
government to nationalize the primary schools for the sake of reaching the UN Millennium 
Development Goal on education and it was the final year of the National Parliament and the 
government had to begin its preparation for the general election that was to be held less than 
a year later. This update only ensures that there is no improvement to the situation in civil 
society and its political relations23.  
Case Study Summary 
The case study findings may be summarized by the following observations related to politics 
and democracy found among the CSOs at the periphery of Bangladesh, despite their widely 
varying composition, functions, budgets and membership. 
1. Whether the CSO is a traditional labor union, a modern development NGO or even a 
small cooperative, it requires informal political connections to survive and manage its 
organization. Further, political blessings, especially from the government party, are 
essential for the CSOs to proceed with their interests and expand their functions and 
projects. 
2. In all cases, there are specific, well-structured and seemingly democratic systems to 
elect executive committees and ensure member participation. However, in reality, 
these written systems are only de jure formalities. Practically, in most cases, internal 
democracy and equality among all members are poorly maintained. For example, in 
the case of the labor union, the leaders supporting the government party actually enjoy 
                                                             
23 From 2013, the process of nationalizing the private primary schools is going on face by face. However, there 
are allegations on process of selecting and inspecting these schools for approval that is, deciding which primary 
schools shall be brought under government regulations and be declared public schools. Moreover, the salary of 
government primary school teachers has also increased. However, the teachers and head  masters still rank very 
low (third class gazetted officer) in the national pay scale system for which they have again begun different 
types of symbolic movements (The Daily Star 5 October, 2015  http://www.thedailystar.net/country/primary-
teachers-suspend-movement-152227 accessed on 4 March, 2017.) 
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most of the union’s power. Elections are not held regularly among the cooperative 
members or the citizen groups. Even for a development NGO, the driving force is the 
charisma of the founding leader. Such charisma is more important than elections at 
different levels.  
3. In all cases, there seem to be differences between the position, power and status of the 
CSO leader versus the general membership. The leader always enjoys greater status in 
relation to political links, financial resources and social position. 
4. Violence and protests are more common among conventional CSOs like labor unions 
and citizen’s groups. Conversely, the presence of government pressure, ‘red tapeism’, 
and political control are found among all types of CSOs, particularly among those 
organizations that are engaged in state monitoring, address large budget projects or 
control a large number of general voters such as citizens’ groups, labor unions or 
large development NGOs. 
5. Political interventions, often lead the professional groups to factionalism. The faction 
leaders often compromise their group interest to the interest of the political bloc they 
affiliate with. Only when the government interests and CSOs’ interest have some 
common proponents, civil society advocacy and movements may reach a positive 
outcome. Otherwise, civil society in most cases is controlled and used by the political 
blocks. 
After the field work in 2006, a decade has passed. In the meantime there have been changes 
in nature and function of the NGOs and some other civil society organizations as well as their 
relationship with the government. The conclusion of the paper restates and re-establishes the 
arguments of the present research about the politicized civil society on the basis of the case 
studies analyzed and with the updated information available from the press and recent 
references. 
Conclusion 
The Neo-Tocquevillean school presumes that the more associations there are in a country the 
greater the possibility that democratic institutions will improve. Diamond (1996) is optimistic 
that civil society movement and actions may make it through the undemocratic environment 
and contribute to better democratic atmosphere in multiple ways like fighting against 
corruption, nurturing democratic values, bringing an end to clientelism, bringing unity among 
social cleavages and so on. The Bangladesh case has proved such expectations from a civil 
society to be unrealistic and normative. In contrast to the Neo-Tocquevillean model, the 
situation in Bangladesh better resembles the Gramscian model. Civil society is found to be 
enmeshed with the political structure. CSOs have been found to be actually engaged, 
intentionally or unintentionally, in executing the ideological hegemony of the state, the 
government and mostly the political parties. CSOs have often failed to remain neutral and are 
often controlled by a political party or bloc. Compromising their independence and vigilance, 
they are working instead as agents to ensure the political agenda of the party with whom they 
indirectly identify. Regardless, they may be termed as organizations working to ensure 
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political hegemony. However, because civil society is partitioned along competing party lines 
and the government generally ignores peaceful protests and formal petitions, CSOs 
sometimes engage in protest, including strikes that may be compared to anti-state hegemony. 
Articulations of interests through violence and strikes do not imply a strong civil society. 
Rather, it implies a lack of proper harmony between the state and civil society and the 
presence of deprivation and extremism. The reason behind the emptiness of civil society is 
because it is politicized. In the last decade there had been a good number of violent protests 
from the garment’s workers24 for wage rise, protection and other issues. For a long time, 
trade unions were banned in the garments sector to avoid violence and disruption to the 
largest dominating industry of the nation. Again, the highly politicized and factious transport 
owners and workers’ groups in Bangladesh often call on strike and use the means of 
vandalism to press their demands that may or may not be rational. However, it is the 
economy and the citizens who have to pay most, due to such strikes and violence25.  
Through the case studies, the politicization of the CSOs, the influence of the ruling 
party, the divisions within civil society and the societies’ alignments along party lines have 
been shown to be factual. It was revealed that for CSOs, whether rural or urban, large or 
small, survival requires political connections. Without political blessing, it is not possible for 
CSOs to move forward. Systems for internal democracy are often fractured along national 
party lines. Any advocacy that may go against the regime is generally met with strong 
resistance from the state. In the last five years, a good number of incidents took place at the 
national level that have attracted international attention, and depict an intolerant regime 
towards the vigilant section of the civil society. We may mention the conflict between Nobel 
Laureate Professor Yunus, founder of Grameen Bank, and the government26, arrest of the 
secretary of the human rights organization Odhikar27, passing a more strict Foreign Donation 
Regulation Bill 2016, in reaction to a report by Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) 
criticizing the performance of the Parliament in 2015 (Amnesty International Public 
Statement, 2016). However, this same foreign funded NGO TIB was successful in 
influencing the government to pass the 2009 Right to Information Act (Lewis 2016, p 124). 
                                                             
24 Garment’s Industry and Ready Made Garments export is vital to Bangladesh’s economy and development, 
This sector contributes 81.2 % to the national export (BGMEA website, 2017). But often this industry is hit by 
accidents like fires and building collapses and the production is set back by violent protests from the laborers for 
their due wages. In most cases, the owners and guilty persons remain above the law due to their strong political 
connections with the higher ups.  
 
25 This reference provides only a recent example of such violence, ‘Countrywide Transport Strike Underway’, 
Dhaka Tribune, 28 February 2017, accessed 6 March 2017 at  
http://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2017/02/28/countrywide-transport-strike-underway/.  
 
26 Professor Yunus was removed from his post as the managing director of the Grameen Bank, after allegations 
of irregularities in its operation. Professor Yunus, an outspoken critic of  corruption, had angered the senior 
politicians in 2007 by briefly floating a political party. The government had been very aggressive, in their 
campaign against him which had not been well-received internationally ( BBC News 2011;Burke 2011). 
 
27 A leading human rights activist and secretary to the human rights organization named Odhikar, Adilur 
Rahman Khan, had been arrested on charges of falsehood about violence by state security forces in 2013. His 
organization is always critical about state administered human rights violation. Again, Khan is a lawyer and 
former deputy attorney general. He served in this prestigious post during the rule of opposition party -BNP. 
Naturally, he had always been under the keen scrutiny of the party in power (Hammadi 2013).  
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This means, that, in recent years, few large and advocacy NGOs have tried to come out from 
the political influence and emerge as watchdogs to the government performances. 
Conversely, the authorities are not prepared yet to tolerate or welcome such civil society 
activism. However, with the advancement of the electronic media in the last ten years, and 
with the help of a relatively free press, apparently an environment of free movement of 
information had been observed within the society. This is expected to lead to a liberal 
government committed to transparency, accountability and responsiveness. In contrast to the 
situation, editors are being blasted and facing court cases for sedition28 that only weakens the 
civil society. 
Nevertheless, at the local level, organizational strength and the ability to form 
collective opinions of the CSOs have attracted local elites and political parties towards them. 
The leaders of the central cooperative are often targeted by political leaders because of the 
large amounts of loan money they manage and distribute and the influence they enjoy with 
their members. Patterns of membership and participation within non-political citizens groups 
also reflect the political divide in the society. 
So it may be understood that politicization and control is evident both at the periphery 
and at the core of civil society. Instead of monitoring the state apparatus, they are 
contributing to the misdeeds of the government and political parties. Since 2006, there have 
been hardly any changes to the political trend and divisions among the professional groups 
and intellectuals. Rather, new factions came to compete among the divisions found in the 
CSOs. If they continue to bend under political pressure and remain divided among 
themselves along party lines, CSOs can hardly gain the necessary independence and strong 
character to emerge as vigilant forces. Lacking such vigilant power, a civil society, no matter 
how vibrant, cannot contribute to the institutionalization of democracy. 
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